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THE MEDIUM MATTERS: THE EFFECTS OF MEDIA
ATTRIBUTES AND EVIDENCE STRENGTH ON BELIEF
REVISION
Nöteberg, Anna H., University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1074 CX Amsterdam, The
Netherlands, noteberg@uva.nl

Abstract
Face-to-face meetings between auditors and their clients are increasingly difficult to arrange, due to
business globalization and the growing need for rapid audit decision-making. Relying on electronic
communication media, such as e-mail or video conferencing for auditor-client inquiry may be a
logical and simple solution to this problem. However, it may also introduce some threats to the
communication process. This paper posits that the use of electronic communication media biases the
ways in which auditors update their beliefs as a result of information inquiry. We examine to what
extent media attributes affect the auditor’s belief revision, given persuasive intentions on the client’s
side. The media attributes of interest in this paper are (1) a medium’s cue multiplicity (the extent to
which the medium can communicate peripheral cues) and (2) reprocessability (a medium’s ability to
archive messages). Drawing on the Belief Adjustment Model and the Elaboration Likelihood Model,
we demonstrate that the effect of cue multiplicity depends on the strength of the arguments provided by
the client and whether messages can be reprocessed. We report the results of a laboratory experiment
conducted with 199 practicing graduate accounting students.
Keywords: Cue multiplicity, Reprocessability, Evidence Strength, Belief revision, Auditor-client
inquiry, Sequential and simultaneous processing.

1

INTRODUCTION

New electronic media, such as e-mail and video-conferencing systems, are increasingly used for
communication in and between organizations (Baltes, Dickson, Sherman, Bauer, and LaGanke, 2002;
Strauss and McGrath, 1994). This development gives people in geographically dispersed
organizations the opportunity to share information and make decisions effectively and efficiently
without having to meet face-to-face. In the same way, we witness an increasing dispersion of audit
firms and their client companies across the globe, which necessitates the use of virtual meetings for
client inquiry. During an audit engagement, client inquiry is used as one of several methods to collect
relevant evidence by gathering explanatory information from client representatives. Based on clientprovided evidence, the auditor commonly forms his or her judgments. There is reason to believe that
the use of electronic media for client inquiry affects auditors’ information processing strategies,
particularly when the client has persuasive intentions. Audit judgments may be ultimately biased or
distorted. This issue is of particular importance in the auditing profession, where most stakeholders
rely on the objectivity and truthfulness of auditors’ statements.
In this paper, we assume the following scenario, not uncommon in auditor-client negotiations. The
auditor has tentatively recommended that the client make a material adjustment in the financial
statements. The auditor believes that the remaining inventory of a certain kind is obsolete and should
be written-down by a certain amount. The client however disagrees and claims substantive reasons for
a lesser write-down. Given an initially strong belief on the auditor’s side, the client (represented by
the chief financial officer (CFO) of the client company) sends persuasive messages to the auditor,
suggesting a lesser adjustment by providing a set of justifications. We now theorize that the type of
media used for communication will have an impact on the way and the extent to which the evidenceseeking auditor revises his/her belief.
The research model developed here examines why and how the use of electronic communication
media during client inquiry affects the auditor’s belief revision, particularly in cases where the client
has persuasive intentions. To address this question, we examine the influence of the evidence strength
of the communicated message (weak vs. strong arguments), the medium’s ability to reprocess
(archive) messages, and the medium’s cue multiplicity (i.e., the extent to which the medium makes
available various non-content related (peripheral) cues, such as body language, facial expressions,
voice intonations), on auditors’ belief revision strength. Note that in terms of cue multiplicity, we
consider only peripheral cues (i.e., auditory and visual cues) that support the underlying message
given by central cues. Our research model predicts a three-way interaction among the three variables
of interest.

2

THEORY

Reprocessability and cue multiplicity are the two media attributes of interest in this study.
Reprocessability refers to a feature that allows users to re-examine messages while engaged in dialog
(Dennis and Valacich, 1999). Multiplicity of cues represents the number of ways in which a medium
can communicate information other than the content of the message, such as auditory cues (e.g., voice
tone and inflection) and visual cues (e.g., facial gestures and body language) (Chen and Chaiken,
1999; Daft, Lengel, and Klebe Trevino, 1987). We predict that the effect of cue multiplicity on the
auditor’s belief revision strength ultimately depends on the strength of the evidence conveyed during
auditor-client inquiry and whether the recipient can reprocess evidence or not.

2.1

Evidence strength

According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981), message
recipients may follow two distinct routes when processing persuasive information, the central or the
peripheral route. When the central route of persuasion is chosen, message recipients systematically
scrutinize the validity of arguments contained in a persuasive message, and revise their initial beliefs
as a result of the content-related aspects of the message. When a peripheral information-processing
strategy is employed, decision-makers rely on secondary, non-content related cues (as reviewed in
section 2.3). In accordance with the ELM, we describe evidence strength as a central cue. It captures
the pure signal of a message. Given that message recipients are motivated and able to process the
central cue of a message, they will revise their belief more strongly when the central cue is strong as
compared to weak. We posit that evidence strength has a positive influence on belief revision, i.e., the
stronger the evidence provided by the client, the more persuasive it is and the more will the auditor
adjust his or her belief.
H1:
2.2

There is a positive relationship between evidence strength and belief revision strength.
Reprocessability

Reprocessability refers to a feature that allows users to re-examine messages while engaged in dialog
(Dennis and Valacich, 1999). It is a media attribute that acts as an “externally recorded memory”
(Sproull, 1991) and thereby aids in understanding the situation, particularly as the volume, complexity,
or equivocality of the message increase. While reprocessability has been examined only with regard
to its effect on performance (Dennis and Valacich, 1999), we are interested in its effect on belief
revision. We review the two processing strategies implicit in the Belief Adjustment Model (BAM),
sequential processing and simultaneous processing, to explain reprocessability effects on belief
revision.
The Belief Adjustment Model (BAM) (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992) posits that the information
processing strategy employed by decision-makers affects belief adjustment. Individuals use different
information processing strategies when faced with evidential matter consisting of multiple pieces.
Sequential processing takes place when individuals adjust their beliefs incrementally as each piece of
evidence is offered. Simultaneous processing means that the initial anchor is adjusted upon
presentation of the full, aggregate set of evidential matter.
The area of interest in this study is the auditor’s strength of belief revision as a result of processing
disconfirming evidence. There is reason to believe that individuals make stronger belief revisions
when information is elicited in a sequential format, as compared to a simultaneous format. Ashton and
Ashton (1988) note that when auditors have a disconfirmation-prone attitude, sequential evaluation of
consistently negative evidence will result in more extreme belief change than simultaneous processing
of the same evidence, a phenomenon called the “dilution effect” (Ashton and Ashton, 1988).
Consequently, belief revision should be stronger when evidence is processed sequentially as opposed
to simultaneously. For instance, if individuals are presented with 10 pieces of negative evidence in a
simultaneous format and are asked for their beliefs, they will typically adjust their beliefs negatively.
Furthermore, if individuals are asked to revise beliefs after each of the 10 pieces of evidence is
presented, their final belief state will be more negative than in the simultaneous format.
The reason for this effect is that sequential evidence processing offers more opportunities to anchor
and adjust than simultaneous processing. More frequent information displays increase the value
relevance of the information and cause individuals to increase the amount of anchoring and adjustment
of their beliefs, resulting in a more extreme revision in the direction of the evidence (Francis and
Schipper, 1999). Research has indeed found that individuals over-adjust in the direction of the
informational items (e.g., Pinsker, 2003).

Returning to the media attribute of interest, let us first contemplate the use of a medium that lacks
reprocessability, i.e., messages are not stored for later re-examination. Hence, during belief revision,
the information recipient can only process persuasive evidence once and does not have the means to
go back and again process the arguments. As a result, the decision-maker is compelled to process the
evidence simultaneously to produce a revised judgment. Next, assume that the medium used for
message conveyance allows the decision-maker to re-examine the given evidence cues after a first
round of processing, i.e., a medium possessing the attribute of reprocessability. We argue that the
ability to reprocess messages evokes a sequential processing strategy, because the decision-maker has
multiple occasions to revise his or her initial belief by re-examining the evidence. While previous
research has only considered the sequential or simultaneous processing of central message cues, we
include the processing of peripheral cues as well. As will be described in the following section, some
media convey a higher level of cue multiplicity than others. We predict stronger belief revision when
central and peripheral cues are processed sequentially as compared to simultaneously. Hence, we
expect that belief revision strength will increase with the presence of reprocessability as compared to
its absence. The following hypothesis is offered:
H2:

There is a positive relationship between reprocessability and belief revision strength.

So far, we have predicted positive effects of both reprocessability and evidence strength on belief
revision. Further, while we assume that cue multiplicity will also affect belief revision positively, we
posit that its positive effect will vary in strength, depending on the strength of the evidence and the
absence or presence of reprocessability.
2.3

Cue multiplicity

While evidence strength (as described earlier) captures the pure signal of a message as reflected by the
central route to persuasion, we add peripheral message cues to our model, in order to further elucidate
a decision-maker’s reaction to persuasive evidence. When a peripheral information processingstrategy is employed, recipients rely on secondary, personal and social cues in their belief revision,
which are not related to the message itself (Chen and Chaiken, 1999). Cues such as source
attractiveness and a pleasurable voice may have persuasive power without raising considerable mental
effort for evaluation of the central message.
Communication media may hold a high or low level of cue multiplicity. Media that restrict the
availability of peripheral factors provide a low level of cue multiplicity (e.g., e-mail), whereas those
that provide access to such cues contain a high level of cue multiplicity (e.g., video-recorded
presentations). Previous research has examined the impact of cue multiplicity on various
communication outcomes, such as managers’ decision performance in terms of effectiveness and
efficiency (e.g., Daft and Lengel, 1986; Daft, Lengel, and Klebe Trevino, 1987; Dennis and Kinney,
1998; Hollingshead, McGrath, and O'Connor, 1993; Kraut, Galegher, Fish, and Chalfonte, 1992; Rice,
1992; Suh, 1999), attitude change (e.g., Matheson and Zanna, 1989), communicator likeability (e.g.,
Weisband and Atwater, 1999). We are here interested in the effect of cue multiplicity on belief
revision.
As suggested by Chaiken and Eagly (1983), we posit that high cue multiplicity enables peripheral
processing by drawing the message recipient’s attention to the communicator’s peripheral cues. Thus,
assuming that peripheral signals comprise the same direction as the central cue, a medium with high
cue multiplicity should generally enhance the message’s persuasiveness, as compared to a medium
low in cue multiplicity. We posit that the belief revision effect of cue multiplicity depends on the
strength of the evidence and the presence or absence of reprocessability, as reviewed next.
First, let us consider evidence that is weak in nature. In other words, the information sender provides
persuasive evidence, which disconfirms the recipient’s initial belief, employing relatively weak
arguments. Hypothesis 3 concerns belief revision effects of cue multiplicity when evidence is weak
and reprocessability is either present or absent.

Assuming weak evidence and the absence of reprocessability, cue multiplicity has a positive effect on
belief revision. As described earlier, when individuals are exposed to peripheral cues that support the
central message, their belief revision will increase as opposed to the lack of peripheral cues.
Further, the presence of reprocessability will significantly amplify the positive effect of cue
multiplicity, because individuals are not only exposed to additional, supportive peripheral information,
but they are also exposed to this information more than once, due to reprocessability. Reprocessability
gives decision-makers multiple opportunities to anchor and adjust central and peripheral cues.
Individuals may be particularly susceptible to anchoring and adjusting peripheral cues when central
cues are weak. As a result, given weak evidence, the effect of cue multiplicity on belief revision
strength is more powerful when the medium provides reprocessability. Thus, we posit Hypothesis 3:
H3:

When evidence is weak, the difference in belief revision strength between high and
low cue multiplicity is greater when reprocessability is present as compared to absent.

We have so far considered the effects of cue multiplicity on belief revision strength, when the
conveyed information is weak in nature and reprocessability is either present or absent. Hypothesis 3
suggests an additive effect of the two media attributes. This interaction pattern is expected to change
considerably in the light of strong evidence.
Assuming strong evidence and the absence of reprocessability, higher as compared to lower cue
multiplicity is still expected to strengthen belief adjustment considerably. Posit that the auditor is
exposed to strong pieces of evidence by e-mail. While belief revision will be relatively strong already
(due to strong arguments), it will become even stronger when the medium provides a high level of cue
multiplicity (e.g., video), for reasons discussed earlier.
However, this cue multiplicity effect becomes less pronounced when strong evidence can be
reprocessed. The reason is that peripheral cues are expected to exert a negligible effect on belief
adjustment in the light of strong evidence and the presence of reprocessability. For instance, assume
that an auditor is exposed to a list of very strong arguments. Given the chance to reprocess the
arguments, his or her ultimate belief adjustment level will most likely be reached without further
persuasion introduced by peripheral cues. This prediction considers the occurrence of a ceiling effect
when evidence is strong and reprocessability is present. We argue that the effect of evidence strength
and reprocessability alone will cause decision-makers to reach the maximum belief revision possible.
Adding peripheral cues to the message will not make much difference, because decision-makers have
already reached their ‘ceiling’. Accordingly, Hypothesis 4 is offered.
H4:

3

When evidence is strong, the difference in belief revision strength between high and
low multiplicity of cues is lesser when reprocessability is present as compared to
absent.

METHOD

A laboratory experiment was conducted to investigate and test research hypotheses. The experiment
reflected a 2 by 2 by 2 between-subjects, full-factorial, pre- and post-test design.
3.1

Sample

Participants were practicing accountants enrolled in part-time graduate accounting/auditing training
programs at two universities. This sample understands the experimental task, given their training and
professional experience. 14 computerized sessions were run and each session lasted approximately 45
minutes (including instructions and debriefing). The amount of participants varied between 5 and 28
across sessions. An incentive to perform well was provided to participants by giving them the
opportunity to win one out of two digital video cameras.

3.2

Experimental task and procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight treatment conditions. Participants in this
experiment were asked to make a judgment based on certain background information and the
manipulated additional evidence cues.
All participants were instructed to assume the role of a partner in a large accounting firm, in charge of
the audit of a computer manufacturer called “MicroClone”. According to the background case, the
auditor’s current task is to evaluate whether client-provided explanations account for problems that
have been detected in the company’s finished goods inventory valued at €2 million. Specifically, a
review of the situation reveals to the audit team that the company may have overvalued their inventory
of 4th generation personal computers by about €400,000. 5th generation computers are becoming
current standard. Therefore, it seems that the 4th generation computers should be written off as
obsolete, since they will be difficult to sell at the estimated price.
This background case was pre-tested to invoke a strong belief anchor regarding the suggested
inventory write-down of €400,000. Experiment participants were asked to state their current belief
regarding this figure, used as the anchor or pre-test measurement during analysis.
Next, the company’s CFO reacts on the concerns by sending five explanations for why the 4th
generation computers should be written down at an amount less than €400,000. The five arguments
provided by MicroClone’s CFO were presented in random order and according to one out of the eight
treatment conditions. All CFO-provided arguments, whether strong or weak, were designed to be
consistently in disagreement with the background information, thus expected to cause participants to
make a downward belief revision regarding the inventory write-down estimation.
Having read the manipulated information, participants were again asked to state their updated belief
regarding the €400,000 figure, followed by a post-experimental questionnaire, collecting data on
manipulation checks and demographics. Finally, all participants were exposed to a filler task, which
prevented them from leaving while others in the room were still working on the main task. Once
experimental data from all participants was received, participants were debriefed.
3.3

Treatments

We manipulated each factor at two levels, i.e., evidence strength high or low, reprocessability absent
or present, and cue multiplicity high or low, resulting in eight (8) treatment conditions.
We view evidence strength as a function of source objectivity, source independence and evidence
verifiability. In each one of the five messages, the CFO refers to a secondary evidence source, which
confirms the argument that the CFO provides. Messages that were manipulated to be weak in nature
refer to a source inside the company. Using an internal source was expected to create doubts among
participants with regard to the source’s independence. Further, this person’s role description is
designed to poorly qualify him/her to make the statement provided. This mismatch of qualification
was designed to make participants suspicious about source credibility.
Participants in the strong evidence treatment condition were exposed to the same argument in terms of
content. However, in this case, the CFO refers to a well-known expert who confirms the CFO’s
message in a published article, attached to the message. This source is external to the audited
company and therefore independent. The source is also described as an expert in the field, which was
expected to increase its perceived credibility. Further, in the strong evidence scenario, participants
were informed that the senior manager of the audit verified the genuineness of the published article,
thus increasing evidence verifiability.
With regard to reprocessability, this study considers two treatment conditions, i.e., CFO-provided
messages are either re-examined or not. Following the first round of message exposure, participants in
the ‘reprocessability present’ condition were instructed to review messages a second time.

Participants in the ‘reprocessability absent’ condition were not given the opportunity to review
messages after the first round but were instead linked straight to the screens displaying postmanipulation questions.
Cue multiplicity was manipulated by presenting evidence by either e-mail or video. First, electronic
mail, a well-known and widely used communication medium, is low in cue multiplicity. Its
predominant form of communication is written text, which does not allow for any peripheral cues.
The presentation format chosen for high cue multiplicity was a set of five separate video files that
were displayed on the participants’ screens. Upon activation, each video clip showed the CFO
conveying the message using the same wording as the e-mails. Instead of utilizing the power of
acting, we employed other peripheral cues in the video format to maintain a high level of peripheral
persuasiveness. As a result, the chosen actor was male, around fifty years of age, dressed in a dark
suit and wearing glasses, i.e., a stereotypical business professional as portrayed in the mass media.
The video clips show his head and upper torso (a so-called “medium shot”) in an office environment,
i.e., seated at a desk in daylight with a computer next to him.
3.4

Measures

The dependent variable to test our hypotheses was belief strength regarding the audited company’s
inventory valuation, following CFO-provided evidence. The belief strength was measured based on
the assessment made after the five CFO-provided explanations were presented to participants (the
post-test measure). The 7-point Likert dependent variable measure read: “Given the available
information, I strongly believe that MicroClone should write down their 4th generation inventory by
the entire amount of €400,000.”
We measured participants’ belief anchor employing the same measurement as for the dependent
measure. Before they were exposed to the five pieces of additional information (the treatment),
participants were thus asked to state their current belief strength in an inventory write-down estimation
of €400,000. This initial measure constituted the belief anchor or pre-test and was used as a covariate
during data analysis.

4

DATA ANALYSIS

4.1

Sample demographics

A total of 199 practicing, graduate, part-time accounting students participated in this study, out of
which 189 observations were finally used for analysis. 10 observations were removed from the data
because these participants revised their beliefs upward, thus apparently not understanding the task.
Individual cell sizes for all eight conditions ranged from 21 to 26, with a median cell size of 23 and a
mode of 26.
In summary, participants were between 20 and 52 years of age (M = 26.67, SD = 5.210). 123
participants (65.1%) were male, while 66 (34.9%) were female. This slight over-representation of
males in the sample reflects the gender distribution in the auditing profession. 131 (69.3%)
participants were in their first year of graduate education, 38 (20.1%) were in their second, and 20
(10.6%) participants were in their third year. Most participants had some level of work experience in
the field of accounting and/or controlling. 13 participants (6.9%) had no experience at all, 21 (11.1%)
had less than a year of work experience, 44 (23.3%) had been working between 1 and 2 years, 96
(50.8%) had between 3 and 5 years of experience, 13 (6.9%) had worked up to 10 years and one (.5%)
participant had more than 10 years of accounting/controlling experience. Participants were enrolled at
one out of two Dutch universities at which data was also collected.

Treatment conditions did not vary significantly when compared across the demographic variables –
location, session, age, gender, year of study, educational background and work experience – indicating
successful treatment randomization.
4.2

Preliminary testing

All manipulation checks were significant and in the intended direction, indicating that participants
were aware of which treatment condition they were in.
This design employed a pre-post-test measurement design, for which the analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) is a commonly employed method. The belief anchor measure was incorporated as a
covariate in the final model to adjust for pre-test differences. We used ANCOVA to test for main and
interactive effects of message reprocessability (present or absent), evidence strength (high or low) and
cue multiplicity (high or low) on belief revision strength.
Full factorial ANCOVA results using pre-test and location as covariates (see Table 1) indicated a
significant three-way interaction (reprocessability by evidence strength by cue multiplicity), a
significant two-way interaction (cue multiplicity by reprocessability) and a significant main effect
(evidence strength). The covariate ‘belief anchor’ had a significant effect on belief revision strength.
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Pretest Belief
Evidence Strength
Reprocessability
Cue Multiplicity
Evidence Strength * Reprocessability
Evidence Strength * Cue Multiplicity
Reprocessability * Cue Multiplicity
Evidence Strength * Reprocessability * Cue Multiplicity
Error
Total
Corrected Total
R Squared = .315 (Adjusted R Squared = .284)

Table 1.
4.3

Type III Sum of
Squares
a
150.075
9.336
114.079
5.201
0.08029
.359
2.712
1.073
12.784
9.296
326.877
1696.000
476.952

df
8
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
180
189
188

Mean
Square
18.759
9.336
114.079
5.201
0.08029
.359
2.712
1.073
12.784
9.296
1.816

F
10.330
5.141
62.819
2.864
.044
.198
1.493
.591
7.040
5.119

Sig.
.000
.025
.000
.092
.834
.657
.223
.443
.009
.025

ANCOVA
Hypotheses testing

Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive effect of evidence strength on belief revision strength. Empirical
results support this hypothesis (see Table 1). However, since the ANCOVA shows an interaction
between the three factors, we need to be cautious when analyzing and interpreting such main effects.
While we here preliminarily support H1, we refer the reader to the analysis of the observed three-way
interaction for a more detailed interpretation.
Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive effect of reprocessability on belief revision strength. This
hypothesis was not supported by our observations (see Table 1). However, as indicated by the
significant three-way interaction, reprocessability is significantly related to belief revision strength, as
will be analyzed next.
In order to test Hypotheses 3 and 4, we conducted four planned pair-wise mean comparisons. To test
Hypothesis 3, we first examined the difference in belief revision means between treatment group 5 and
7 (see Table 2). Examining the pairwise comparisons for these four groups, we found that both mean
comparisons are significant (see Table 2). This finding enables further analysis in terms of the
differing magnitudes. Comparing mean difference magnitudes, we discovered that they invert.

Adjusted Posttest Mean of
Treatment Condition

vs.

Adjusted Posttest Mean of
Treatment Condition

Mean Difference Significance

High Cue Multiplicity
Low Cue Multiplicity
1 High Reprocessability 2.598 vs. 3 High Reprocessability 2.436
High Evidence Strength
High Evidence Strength

-.162

.691

High Cue Multiplicity
Low Cue Multiplicity
2 Low Reprocessability
2.392 vs. 4 Low Reprocessability
2.077
High Evidence Strength
High Evidence Strength

-.316

.434

High Cue Multiplicity
Low Cue Multiplicity
5 High Reprocessability 2.094 vs. 7 High Reprocessability 3.125
Low Evidence Strength
Low Evidence Strength

-1.031

.006*

.903

.022**

High Cue Multiplicity
Low Cue Multiplicity
6 Low Reprocessability
3.260 vs. 8 Low Reprocessability
2.357
Low Evidence Strength
Low Evidence Strength
* p < .01
** p < .05

Table 2.

Planned comparisons for hypothesis testing (H3 and H4)

Observed Belief Revision Strength

A graphical representation of this finding illustrates this relationship (see Figure 1). Table 2 shows
that cue multiplicity had the predicted positive effect on belief revision strength when reprocessability
was present (p = .006). Belief revision was (as hypothesized) stronger when evidence was presented
by video as compared to e-mail. However, when reprocessability was absent, cue multiplicity had a
negative effect on belief revision strength (p = .022). Here, belief revision was stronger when
evidence was presented by a medium possessing a low level of cue multiplicity (e-mail) as compared
to a medium with a high cue multiplicity level (video). The difference in belief revision strength
between relatively high and low multiplicity of cues is indeed greater when reprocessability is present
as compared to absent. Hypothesis 3 is therefore supported.
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6

Low Cue Multiplicity

0.5

High Cue Multiplicity

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Reprocessability
absent

Figure 1.

Reprocessability
present

The relationship between cue multiplicity and belief revision strength when evidence
is weak1

Hypothesis 4 predicted that the mean difference in belief revision between groups 2 and 4 would be
greater than the difference between groups 1 and 3 (see Table 2). However, planned mean
1

For illustrative reasons, the mean scores used in Figure 1 are based on the percentage belief revision, i.e., using a score computed by
dividing participants’ post-test by their pre-test and subtracting the result from 1.

comparisons produce non-significant results for both mean comparisons (see Table 2). This finding
indicates that, given strong evidence, belief revision remains equal across cue multiplicity levels,
regardless of reprocessability. Thus, in light of strong evidence, we cannot conclude any difference in
belief revision strength between high and low cue multiplicity when reprocessability is present as
compared to absent. As a result, Hypothesis 4 is not supported.
Let us now return to the effect of reprocessability on belief revision strength (H2). We noted that no
main effect was found.
However, during post-hoc analyses, we compared the effect of
reprocessability, holding evidence strength and cue multiplicity either high or low. Given strong
evidence, we found no effect of reprocessability, neither for high nor low cue multiplicity. Further,
given weak evidence, multiple post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that the effect of
reprocessability is insignificant for low cue multiplicity but significant and positive for high cue
multiplicity (p < .10). In graphical terms (see Figure 1), this means that the line representing low cue
multiplicity is statistically parallel, whereas the line representing high cue multiplicity is ascending.
Hence, reprocessability did indeed affect belief revision strength when evidence was weak and cue
multiplicity was high, partially confirming H2. These findings will be discussed in the next section.

5

RESULTS

Our theory suggests that the interaction effect of cue multiplicity and reprocessability is related to an
additive effect when evidence is weak. Further, to account for the different interaction effect for
strong evidence, we suggested a ceiling effect. However, empirical findings cast a different light on
the found interaction.
First, when strong evidence was presented to experiment participants, belief revision strength was
entirely unaffected by cue multiplicity, reprocessability, and their interaction. Belief revision strength
remained equal, regardless of the medium used for information conveyance. The most likely
explanation for this finding is that the arguments’ objective strength took precedence over any possible
media effects. Arguably, participants perceived the evidence provided as sufficiently strong in its own
right to cause a ceiling effect in their belief revision strength. A possible conclusion to draw from this
finding is that in light of strong evidence, individuals are strongly persuaded regardless of the media
that the information is presented with.
Second, when evidence was weak, the role of media attributes in auditors’ belief revision strength
grew in importance (see Figure 1). According to the observations, the effect of cue multiplicity
inverted depending on whether participants reprocessed evidence cues or not. Thus, when the medium
lacked the reprocessability feature, the effect of cue multiplicity on belief revision strength was
negative, whereas this effect was positive when messages could be reprocessed.
We offer the following explanations for these findings. When individuals are exposed to weak
evidence lacking peripheral cues, they focus their full attention on the central cues of the message.
While we expected that reprocessability would strengthen belief revision, this media attribute had no
effect here. We offer the following possible explanation for the null-effect of reprocessability in this
scenario. Given that central message cues were relatively non-complex and that no peripheral cues
were available, we argue that participants possibly reached their final belief revision after the first
round of processing. Although participants in the “reprocessability present” condition were forced to
go through the messages once more, their belief revision was not additionally affected by this evoked
sequential processing, because they could only reprocess what they had already read. Had the content
of the messages been more complex, repeated exposure might have created the predicted belief
revision effect. As a result, belief revision strength did not differ across reprocessability treatment
groups, when cue multiplicity was low.
Next, when individuals were exposed to weak evidence conveyed by a medium with a high level of
cue multiplicity, reprocessing messages directed recipients’ attention toward the persuasive peripheral
cues of the message, as suggested by our theory. When reprocessing, they probably did not listen to

the central cues of the message again, but were instead susceptible to the peripheral cues’
persuasiveness, which in turn increased belief revision.
The explanations above implicitly account for the positive effect of cue multiplicity when
reprocessability was present and evidence was weak: Reprocessing a weak message with peripheral
cues directed message recipients’ attention away from the weak nature of the message, whereas
reconsideration of a weak message without peripheral cues achieved the opposite. Therefore, we posit
that high cue multiplicity lead to stronger belief revision than did low cue multiplicity.
Finally, we offer the following possible explanation for the unexpected negative effect of cue
multiplicity when reprocessability was absent. We posit that in the absence of reprocessability,
individuals’ cognitive capacity was possibly overtaxed when they processed high cue multiplicity
(video) messages. Participants had no control over the speed of video message presentation, other
than pushing the play/stop button. Thus, videos were played once at a pre-determined speed. This
increased complexity due to (1) peripheral cues, (2) participants’ inability to control the speed of
information reception and (3) the absence of reprocessability may have created some uncertainty
among participants. As a result, participants (assuming their role as auditors) may have preferred to be
conservative in their belief revision and thus revise their beliefs only to a very limited extent. On the
other hand, e-mail recipients were able to read and process messages at their own pace during this one
round of evidence presentation. They chose to revise their beliefs more strongly than the video
recipients, possibly because (1) the technology did not force them to process the information at a
certain speed combined with the fact that (2) they had no peripheral cues to process. As a result, they
were less uncertain about the conveyed information and thus less conservative in their belief revision.
Of course, this explanation is merely speculative. The unexpected negative cue multiplicity effect
calls for further research to be thoroughly explained.

6

IMPLICATIONS

This study provides a theoretical and empirical contribution to both information systems and auditing
literature, as it incorporates information systems research combined with auditing related theory in a
judgment and decision-making context. Whereas previous media studies in IS have primarily
examined the impact of communication media attributes on performance, this study is unique in that it
investigates belief revision effects. We attempted to broaden the scope of the BAM by incorporating
the consideration of computer-mediated evidence acquiescence and the contemplation of peripheral
cues. While the empirical results do not fully support our hypotheses, evidence suggests that
individuals are biased in their belief revision process, depending on the level of cue multiplicity and
reprocessability provided by the medium. Particularly the perception of weak evidence may be
seriously affected depending on the presentation format.
In a more practical regard, we demonstrate that the auditing profession, one that has to judge and rely
on potentially biased evidence, might need to take into account the various possibilities and threats
that computer-mediated communication for client inquiry introduce.
While technological
developments and the use of electronic media for evidence collection provide many benefits, they may
also bias judgment in less desirable ways, if the evidence source has deceitful intentions. Naturally,
such warnings apply also to other business professions that employ electronic media for
communication and that depend on potentially biased sources for their decision-making.

7

FUTURE RESEARCH

While the present research is limited to a specific communication setting (auditor-client inquiry), other
communication scenarios and the effects of media attributes on belief revision may be interesting to
consider in future research.

Further, this study introduced peripheral cues as an important determinant of belief revision.
However, we only considered peripheral cues that were in accordance with the direction of the central
message cues. In future research, it would be interesting to investigate the interactive effect of cue
format (central vs. peripheral), cue strength (strong or weak) and cue direction (confirming or
disconfirming an initial belief) on belief revision strength.
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